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Recent Cases
in public policy, the focus is not on the
government agency's subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred by statute or regulation. Rather,
the focus is on the nature of the actions taken and on whether these actions are susceptible to policy analysis.
The Eighth Circuit declared that a
government agency's day-to-day decisions made in furtherance of policy
will be protected under the exception
from tort claims, especially when the
decisions relate to the extent to which
the agency must supervise the safety
procedures of private individuals.
Such supervision is neither feasible
nor practical in light of an agency's
staffing or funding. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusions on the FTCA tort claim exception.
The district court concluded that
the VA' s policy under its housing loan
program was to sell acquired property
quickly and at the best attainable price.
To further this policy, the VA hired a
management broker who would clean
the grounds and building and minimize the risk of loss from theft, vandalism, and the elements. The district
court found the VA's actions as a
seller of property to be discretionary
and not subject to statutory or regulatory requirements mandating it or its
assignees to inspect for asbestos.
Thus, the district court determined
that the VA fell within the FTCA tort
claim exception. The Eighth Circuit
agreed with the district court's decision.

I
release of hazardous substances. 42
U.S.C. Sections 9607(2) and 9607(3).
Both CERCLA sections require the
release or the disposal of a hazardous
substance at a "facility."
The Eighth Circuit interpreted the
meaning of "facility" under CERCLA.
The definition of 42 U.S.C. Section
9607 (a)(9) includes any building,
structure, installation, equipment, or
any site where a hazardous substance
has been deposited, stored, disposed
of, or placed or otherwise come to be
located. The definition, however, does
not include any "consumer product in
consumer use."
The Eighth Circuit noted that while
other courts have held that a "facility"
could include building materials into
which the asbestos was disposed, as
well as asbestos-filled buildings, Congress intended to provide recovery
under CERCLA only for releases or
threatened releases from inactive and
abandoned waste sites, not releases
from useful consumer products contained in the structure of buildings.
Applying this reasoning, the Eighth
Circuit held that the asbestos in the
Kanes' residence was a consumer
product in consumer use and therefore exempt under CERCLA.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit, in affirming the district court's dismissal of
claims based on the FTCA and
CERCLA, held that the VA was not
liable for damages resulting from the
presence of asbestos in property acquired and sold under the administration of its housing loan program. -*o
Rosaire M. Hall

CERCLA Does Note Apply to a
"Consumer Product in Consumer
Use"
The Eighth Circuit next considered
the Kanes' CERCLA claim. The district court stated that, under CERCLA:
(1) those persons who owned or operated facilities when the hazardous substance disposal occurred, and (2) owners of the hazardous substances who
arranged for disposal or treatment of
those substances at a facility are liable
for costs incurred in response to the
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City of Lansing May Not
Allow Cable Television
Franchisee Mandatory
Access to Private
Property

In City of Lansing v. Edward Rose
Realty, Inc., 502 N.W.2d 638 (Mich.
1993), the Supreme Court of Michigan invalidated a Lansing city ordinance allowing mandatory access to
private property by a cable provider
that had been granted a city franchise.
The court held that the claimed public
purpose of the ordinance was subject
to heightened scrutiny because the
ordinance benefitted a private interest, and this private interest predominated over the public interest. After
applying heightened scrutiny, the court
concluded that the ordinance was unreasonable. The Michigan Supreme
Court also determined that the mandatory access granted by the ordinance exceeded Lansing's authority
to exercise its power of eminent domain. Although the state law authorized Lansing to condemn private
property for any public use within the
scope of its powers, no state statute
identified mandatory access to private property by a city-franchised
cable operator as a public use or purpose. The court found the "public
purposes" that Lansing asserted were
insufficient to overcome a property
owner's right to exclude others from
her property.
Ordinance 753
In 1974, the city of Lansing entered into a franchise agreement with
Continental Cablevision. The agreethe
ment gave
Continental
nonexclusive right to operate its cable
system in Lansing. Continental agreed
to provide nine designated access
channels, universal service, and an
emergency override system. It also
agreed to pay 3 percent of its gross
franchise revenues to Lansing.
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In 1980, owners of two apartment
complexes entered into a private agreement with Continental. That agreement gave Continental the exclusive
right to install and operate its cable
system in the apartments. But in 1986,
Rose Realty, Inc., the new owners of
the complexes, notified Continental
that it would not renew Continental's
contract when it expired in 1987. Rose
also declared its intent to install a
private cable system that would provide apartment tenants with similar
cable service.
In response to Rose's action, Continental submitted a proposed ordinance to the city of Lansing that would
prohibit apartment owners from interfering with a tenant's choice to receive cable service from the city's
franchisee. In 1987, Lansing adopted
Ordinance 753, which provided the
following:
No owner, agent or representative of the owner of any dwelling shall directly or indirectly
prohibit any resident of such
dwelling from receiving cable
communication installation,
maintenance and services from
a Grantee operating under a valid
franchise issued by the City.
If an owner refused access by the
franchised cable service, the cable
service could request that Lansing
begin proceedings to condemn the
property. Ten days after Ordinance
753 was adopted, Continental asked
Lansing to begin condemnation proceedings on the Rose properties.
The Lansing City Council passed a
resolution that declared Continental's
services to be in the public interest. It
found the services to constitute "a
public use, a public purpose, and a
public necessity." The resolution also
authorized the city attorney to take
steps to acquire Rose's properties.
These steps included offering to purchase the properties from Rose. If an
agreement for purchase could not be
reached, the city could file a complaint in which it would ask the court
to determine a fair price to be paid for
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the properties.
When the city of Lansing and Rose
could not agree to a purchase, the city
filed two complaints for condemnation. The two cases were consolidated for a bench trial at which the
judge upheld the validity of the condemnation proceedings.
The Michigan Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's decision. It
found that the primary beneficiary of
the property taking was Continental,
not the public. In addition, the court
found the condemnation to be an attempt by Continental to use Lansing's
taking powers to obtain what it could
not acquire through negotiations with
Rose. The court held that the proposed condemnation exceeded the
city's authority to take private property through its power of eminent domain. The city of Lansing was granted
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Michigan.
Power of Eminent Domain Must Be
Specifically Conferred
In its analysis, the Supreme Court
of Michigan noted that municipalities
have no inherent power to condemn
property even for public benefit or
use. Therefore, municipalities' power
of eminent domain must be specifically conferred by the Michigan constitution, by statute, or by necessary
implication from delegated authority.
The supreme court examined several potential sources of eminent domain. First, the court considered both
the Michigan and U.S. Constitutions.
Both constitutions provide only that
private property is not to be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Next, the court examined the Michigan Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA), under which Lansing began its condemnation proceedings. The court stated that this act
merely "provides standards for the
acquisition of property by an agency,
the conduct of condemnation actions,
and the determination ofjust compensation." It concluded that the UCPA
does not itself confer the power of
eminent domain upon Lansing.

In order to use UCPA procedures, a
city must be authorized by constitution or statute to exercise its power of
eminent domain. The city of Lansing
argued that the Michigan Home Rule
Cities Act, as well as a general statute
applicable to acquisitions by state
agencies and public corporations,
granted it eminent domain in the
present case. The court found these
statutes to authorize Lansing to condemn private property for any public
use within the scope of its powers.
The court found that no state statute exists, however, which identifies
mandatory access to private property
by a city-franchised cable provider as
a public use or purpose. The court
articulated that ordinances passed
under a city's general authority to
condemn property are valid only if
they are reasonable and not oppressive.
Court Examines Questions with
Heightened Scrutiny
The Michigan Supreme Court proceeded to analyze whether Ordinance
753 was reasonable and served a public purpose. Noting that this case
included an issue of first impression
in Michigan, the court first examined
legislation and decisions in other
states. Some states require a tenant to
request cable service before a cable
operator must be allowed access to
residential property. The court noted
that these statutes, however, are unlike Ordinance 753.
In finding these statutes and holdings to be inapplicable to the current
case, the Michigan Supreme Court
noted that unlike New York and New
Jersey, Michigan does not extensively
regulate its cable industry. The Michigan Legislature has not announced
that city-franchised cable operators
have mandatory access to all rental
properties, and it has made no pronouncement of the public benefits of
franchised cable services.
In announcing its refusal to defer
to the city of Lansing's determination
that Ordinance 753 served a public
purpose, the court recognized that the
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ordinance was directed to and
benefitted a single private entity, Continental. It held that "where a proposed government action confers a
benefit on a private interest, unless
that benefit is merely incidental, a
reviewing court will inspect with
heightened scrutiny the assertion by
the governmental entity of a public
purpose."
In finding that Continental would
receive more than an incidental benefit from Ordinance 753, the supreme
court explained that the ordinance
would permit Continental to offer its
full array of services to Rose's tenants, in addition to allowing access
for public, education, and government
(PEG) channels, and emergency override. Moreover, Continental could
receive substantial revenue through
subscription payments and the increased market value of its system.
Heightened scrutiny, the court held,
was appropriate in this case.
To support its claim that
Continental's service constituted a
public use, the city of Lansing offered
its requirements that Continental provide universal service, PEG channels,
and emergency override. In response,
the supreme court examined the merits and functions of each of these services. It agreed with the appellate
court's finding that the requirement
of universal service is not in and of
itself a public purpose. The universal
service requirement acts as a restraint
on cable operators by preventing them
from refusing service to poorer communities. However, it does not authorize the operator to demand access to
every dwelling if the owner does not
desire the service.
Turning to the other services which
Lansing required of Continental, the
court found that a cable operator's
emergency override capacity duplicates that provided by commercial
television stations. It held that this
capability does not entitle the city to
invade private property for the benefit
of a franchisee. The court also recognized the political and educational
benefits that PEG channels could pro94

vide. Nonetheless, it found that in
light of the countervailing private benefits conferred by the mandatory access ordinance, the primary beneficiary of the ordinance was still Continental, not the public.
Lansing asserted three purposes for
allowing mandatory access by Continental: (1) it would encourage
Continental's growth, development,
and responsiveness; (2) it would encourage Continental to provide the
widest variety of information; and (3)
it would promote competition and
minimize unnecessary regulation that
could impose undue economic burdens on the cable system. Because
Continental had such an extensive
private interest, however, the court
found these rationales insufficient to
overcome Rose's right to exclude others from its property.
The supreme court also stated that
the city of Lansing failed to explain its
first two "public purposes." The city
did not delineate how mandatory access to Rose's properties would encourage Continental's growth, development, and responsiveness. Nor did
it explain how mandatory access
would encourage Continental to provide the widest possible variety of
information to its subscribers.
Addressing the third argued purpose, the court dismissed Lansing's
contention that the proposed Ordinance 753 would promote competition within the cable system. It found
several benefits of Ordinance 753 to
be exclusively Continental's. Because
the ordinance allowed mandatory access only by the franchised cable operator, Continental would be the only
cable system with rights to initiate
condemnation proceedings. Also,
Continental would be guaranteed the
right to compete with private cable
systems where it chose to compete,
but other cable systems would not
have the same right. Finally, no person or entity could initiate condemnation proceedings to ensure competition of cable systems. The court noted
that even if other cable systems were
allowed to compete, 90 percent of the

market was already secured by Continental.
Finally, the court examined the legislative history of the 1992 Cable Act,
47 U.S.C. Section 521, and found that
although Congress considered adopting a mandatory access provision, it
deleted the provision before the Cable
Act was passed. The court interpreted
this action as evidence of a congressional desire not to provide for mandatory access. In view of such intent,
and in view of the finding that Continental, not the public, was the primary
beneficiary of Ordinance 753, the
court held that the proposed mandatory access requirement would regulate cable service beyond established
state or federal limits. In doing so, the
city of Lansing would exceed its authority to exercise the power of eminent domain.
Dissent Finds Public is Primary
Beneficiary
The dissent found that the proposed
condemnation was for the primary
benefit of the public cable user. It
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the public benefit of cable
television service failed to outweigh
the private benefit conferred upon
Continental. Additionally, it argued
that the majority failed to consider the
scope of services offered through PEG
channels. Such channels, the dissent
stated, provided political programming, college courses, and forums for
citizens who normally had limited
access to avenues for the dissemination of ideas.
The dissent also disagreed with the
majority's interpretation of the universal service requirement as a restraint on the franchised cable operator which precluded Continental from
refusing to serve poorer communities.
It interpreted this requirement as a
fundamental recognition by Continental that the benefits of cable service
should be realized by all segments of
the community. -*
Caryn R. Suder
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